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an inter-country adoption order via the Children's Court. It must be conceded that the current legal position in regard to inter-country adoptions is a grey area, evidenced by the four separate judgments in the De Gree case.
In addressing this issue, Theron AJA examined the adoption law and Our Constitution decrees, however, that an international treaty shall not have effect until enacted into domestic legislation.6 The basic principles underlying these international documents provide important protection for children and cannot be disregarded solely, because our legislation giving effect to it is held up by the administrative process of drafting regulations in respect of same. The dissenting judgment of Heher J captures this point:
In my view any recognition of the 'Interim Central Authority' or the children's court as an implementer of inter-country adoptions in relation to the present application would be inappropriate. The law must be applied as it is, not as it may become, however probable the prospect. There are of course no regulations in place to regulate inter-country adoptions because there is, at the present time, no statute which authorises the content or making of such regulations...
10 Whilst the learned judge is correct that there is no act or regulations in place to administer inter-country adoptions, the Children's Court must be regarded as a legal 'implementer of inter-country adoptions' following on the Fitzpatrick judgment.
In Fitzpatrick, the Minister of Social Development requested the court to have the order of invalidity of section 18 (4) This principle is, unfortunately, not stated anywhere in the Child Care Act.
Section 40 of the Child Care Act requires Commissioners of Child Welfare to take into consideration the child's 'religion and culture'. It will be very difficult for the court to have regard to these criteria when considering an application to place a child in another country as South African culture is arguably, unique.
The argument of Heher JA on the question of subsidiarity is compelling indeed; that the child concerned was abandoned at birth, has no experience of a religious or cultural background other than that of the first and second respondents which is exactly the same as that of the applicants. The learned judge's contention that the principle of subsidiarity is "very largely reduced in importance by these uncontested facts", however loses sight of the fact that no effort was made to secure a home for the child within South Africa. The principle, as set out in the Preamble to the Convention, presupposes that the initial enquiry must be whether or not a suitable home is available for the child in the country of origin. It is only when this is exhausted that an adoption outside the country should be considered.
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Theron AJA, in denouncing the efforts of the third respondent whose duty it was to attempt to secure suitable care for the child within South Africa, raises the point of the voice of the child. The learned judge says:
Ruth's voice has not been heard in this application. The third respondent, who ought to have represented Ruth's best interests, has failed to do so.12 And in paragraph 25: ... the third respondent, whose function it was to do so, aligned themselves with this application from the outset.
Ponnan JA, echoes the need for the voice of the child to be heard in an application of this nature and finds that the appointment of a curator ad litem was indispensable in this case. He is clear in his assessment that the third respondent had "failed the child".13
It is clear that the roles of the child protection agencies and those facilitating the adoption services should remain separate and distinct. As Theron AJA has pointed out, the child protection agency that is tasked with ensuring the protection of the child and an outcome that is in the best interests of the child should not be accredited with providing inter-country adoption services as this will definitely blur the boundaries. A reading of section 258(2) of the Children's Act together with section 259 permits this very anomaly to occur.14 The constitution and regulation of the functions of the Central Authority may be the only check in this untenable situation.
It is exactly because these loopholes exist that any court needs to be extra vigilant in allowing a child to be removed from the country. In quoting the 12 At par 21. 13 Ponnan JA at par 95. 14 S 258(2) states: "Any powers or duties of the Central Authority in terms of Articles 15 to 21 of the Convention and sections 261 (3) and (4), 262(3) and (4), 264(2) and 265(2) may, to the extent determined by the Central Authority, be performed by: a) another organ of state; b) a child protection organisation accredited in terms of section 259 to provide inter-country adoption services…"
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Constitutional Court in Fitzpatrick, Theron AJA emphasises the greater burden that applicants face in such applicationsuntil the new child care legislation is in operation and infrastructure and international agreements are put in place, prospective adoptive applicants 'will have a greater burden in meeting the requirements of the Child Care Act than they will have thereafter'...
The debate of what was in the best interests of little R clearly illustrated how the standard can indeed take on different shades:
• The appellants argued that if the application were to be refused, the court would be placing the interests of the child secondary to departmental policies and procedures.
• In Fitzpatrick, Goldstone J stated that:
…it is necessary that the [best interests] standard should be flexible as individual circumstances will determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child.15
• Heher J found that:
…while the interests of children generally are important they are only so to the extent that the child in this case will benefit or be adversely affected by the furtherance or limitation of those interests because this matter concerns the child R and no other. The peculiar facts of this case cannot be determinative or even persuasive of the rights of any other child whose interests are not the same.16
The court, however, was not persuaded by this train of thought. After considering the best interests standard as set out in articles 3 and 21 of the UNCRC, and the Hague Convention, the court concluded thatthese international instruments seek to protect the best interests of the child by ensuring, inter alia, that inter-country adoptions are conducted in a responsible and protective manner with the aim of eliminating the various abuses which have been associated with inter-country adoptions.
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With respect, not only was this a more holistic and wide interpretation of the standard, but one that recognises the room for different types of abuse associated with inter-country adoptions which include the trafficking of children.
The court was persuaded by arguments by the Centre for Child Law that entered the matter as amicus curiae. Ann Skelton, counsel for the Centre for
Child Law, argued in written submissions before the courtBy failing to proceed in terms of the Child Care Act, the Children's Court is bypassed and South African children are removed from the country without a formal adoption having been sanctioned by the relevant local authorities. This places the children in a potentially vulnerable position, having left South Africa in terms of a guardianship and custody order granted in favour of potential adoptive parents.
She argues further that once a child has been removed from the country, the is also important for South Africa to send off the child with dignity and secure in the knowledge that the child's rights are protected, and not to abandon South African children to the unknown legal processes of the receiving country.
Ponnan JA, in a judgment that may sometimes only be described as lyrical prose, continues that whilst the "immediate allure of her being placed with the appellants is seductively appealing",17 it falls short of the international principle of subsidiarity as the evidence fell short of establishing that there is an absence 18 Ponnan JA at par 98.
(iii) the need for the child to be brought up in a stable family environment and, where this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment;
(iv) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative proceedings in relation to the child.
Conclusion
In traversing the area of inter-country adoption law against the background of the provisions of the international treaties, to which we are party, and the new Children's Act, which is partly promulgated, we get a glimpse of what is ahead of us for the next few years as we give effect and meaning to the substance of the new legislation. The guidance and direction of the courts will be required in a clear and decisive manner even treading through murky waters as the majority judgment in this case did. Pending the promulgation of the regulations on the Children's Act, especially in regard to inter-country adoptions, the relevant departments must work co-operatively to implement the practice guidelines20 that should aim to encourage rather than dissuade the legal profession from the simpler and more cost effective procedures contained in 
